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The Editorial on the Research Topic
What Determines Social Behavior? Investigating the Role of Emotions, Self-Centered Motives,
and Social Norms
In the last decade, a growing research effort in behavioral sciences, especially psychology and
neuroscience, has been invested in the study of the cognitive, biological, and evolutionary
foundations of social behavior. Differently from the case of sociology, which studies social behavior
also at the group level in terms of organizations and structures, psychology and neuroscience
often define “social” as a feature of the individual brain that allows an efficient interaction with
conspecifics, and thus constitutes a possible evolutionary advantage (Matusall). In this view, an
extremely wide range of mental and neural processes can be classified as “social,” from the coding
of relevant sensory stimuli about conspecifics (facial expressions, gestures, vocalizations, etc.), to
the selection and planning of behavioral responses in complex interpersonal settings (economic
transactions, negotiations, etc.). Despite such heterogeneity, there is a converging interest in
the scientific community toward the identification of neural and psychological mechanisms that
underlie all the many facets of social behavior, and their comparison across species and cultures.
This Research Topic was initiated by researchers from the Swiss National Center of Competence
in Research “Affective Sciences—Emotions in Individual Behaviour and Social Processes,” a
multidisciplinary institution devoted to the study of affect-related processes across various
disciplines (from psychology and neuroscience through to history, philosophy, art, and economy).
In keeping with this spirit, this Research Topic comprehends 38 contributions from an
interdisciplinary community each addressing specific psychological and neural phenomena that
can be defined as “social.” In particular, we collected both theoretical and empirical contributions,
concerning animals, human individuals (neurotypical adults and children, but also individuals
with neurological, psychiatric and developmental disorders) as well as human groups, engaged
in either laboratory-controlled settings or real-life situations. Although the theoretical models
and the applied research techniques (psychophysical, physiological, neuroimaging, genetic) are
very diverse, they converge with a global framework suggesting that the determinants of social
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behavior can be described across two independent dimensions:
(1) a personal-to-environmental dimension, and (2) a transient-
to-stable dimension. These contributions thus represent an
important cornerstone for building an interdisciplinary and
comprehensive model of how individuals deal with the
complexity of their social environment.
PERSONAL-TO-ENVIRONMENTAL
DIMENSION
For the purpose of this editorial, we can schematically describe
social interactions as cases in which an individual is engaged
in a given social environment. Importantly, the individual and
the environment exert reciprocal influence on one another, as
individual changes could cause, and be caused by, changes in
the outside world. Within this context, we can define a behavior
of interest any change of the individual’s state over time (overt
response, brain modulation, etc.), which in turn can be related to
two main explanatory variables: a representation of the current
state of the individual (to know how a person will change one
needs to know how this person is) and a representation of the
current state of the environment (to know how a person will
change one needs to know what surrounds him/her). Thus,
the personal-to-environmental dimension distinguishes between
those determinants of social behavior that are attributable to
idiosyncratic features of the individual from those that are related
to specificities of the environment with which the individual is
interacting. Such simplified model fits well our Research Topic,
as the various contributions highlight the role of many factors
that, despite their diversity, can be readily classified as personal
or environmental.
Among the personal factors, the role played by genetic
polymorphisms is well-described in the present Research
Topic through the use of knock-out mice and endophenotype
approaches in humans. In all these cases, the implicated
genes are known to affect major functions of hormonal and
neurotransmitter systems within brain networks important
for social cognition. For instance, mice lacking the β2
subunit of neuronal nicotinic receptors of acetylcholine exhibit
impaired behavior (relative to wild type mice) when competing
with conspecifics for rewards (Chabout et al.) Furthermore,
following a rich body of literature documenting how intranasal
administration of oxytocin affects human social behavior (see
Ebner et al; Haas et al.; Järvinen and Bellugi, as reviews),
several contributions address the role played by the oxytocin
gene receptor (OXTR). Taking a developmental perspective,
Ebner et al. show how OXTR polymorphisms differently affect
young and older adults’ responses in medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) to facial emotional expressions. Haas et al. suggest how
OXTR polymorphisms might explain variations in individual
cooperative behavior by affecting the structure and function
of key brain areas for social behavior such the amygdala, the
superior temporal sulcus, and the anterior cingulate cortex. It
is possible that brain regions with high density of oxytocin
receptors (such as the amygdala) affect social behavior through
their regulatory role on the autonomic nervous system, an
hypothesis put forward by Järvinen and Bellugi to account
for social dysfunctional behavior in Williams Syndrome, in
addition to more classic effects on cognition or learning. Finally,
Hruschka and Henrich point out that genetic polymorphism
might even explain some cultural differences, as suggested by
the controversial evidence that collectivistic (as opposed to
individualistic) societies might most frequently exhibit allelic
variation of serotonin-transporter-linked polymorphic region
(Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010; Eisenberg and Hayes, 2011).
A few studies also highlighted the role played in social
behavior by individual traits: these are habitual patterns of
behavior, thoughts and emotions that are relatively stable
over time. Although of unclear etiology, inter-individual trait
variability has been often used in the literature as a powerful
factor that explains behavioral differences in the neurotypical
population. This is the case of several studies from the
present Research Topic, who report for instance that individual
empathic traits can influence the decoding of emotional facial
expressions Huelle et al., or monetary decisions on behalf
of unknown people (O’Connell et al.). Furthermore, (Maresh
et al.) find that the neural response to electrical shocks (and
the degree to which this is affected by social proximity) is
modulated by individual anxiety trait, a measure of idiosyncratic
sensitivity to stressors. Finally, this Research Topic includes
multiple studies on individuals exhibiting traits diagnostic of
psychopathy, a developmental syndrome characterized by low
levels of empathy, guilt, and remorse, but increased aggressive
and antisocial behavior (Marsh). In particular, individuals with
high psychopathic scores exhibit altered neural and behavioral
responses in many experimental manipulations related to fear
conditioning (Veit et al.), fear empathy (Marsh), or moral
cognition (Tassy et al.). The case of psychopathy highlights
the close tie between individual traits and the presence of
disorders, which can be considered in some cases as extreme
variants of normative behavioral patterns (Hare and Neumann,
2005; Walton et al., 2008). Consistently, several studies report
atypical social behavior in individuals with psychiatric diagnoses
or neurodevelopmental syndromes. For instance, individuals
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorders show impairments in
tasks involving the inference of others’ thoughts and emotions
(Caletti et al.). In a similar vein, individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorder or Asperger Syndrome display atypical
behavior in several tasks (see Zalla and Sperduti, for review)
ranging from visual processing of emotional facial expressions
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al). to the inference of others’ states,
empathy, and moral cognition (Baez et al.).
Among environmental factors, several studies in the present
Research Topic highlight the role played by social norms. These
can be understood as representations of community’s desires
and expectations about end states that guide our evaluation of
events and the selection of behavioral responses (see Brosch and
Sander, for more details on norms and values). In particular,
Hruschka and Henrich point out that socioeconomic rules
(related to religion or market) can explain the degree to which
populations are eager to exhibit in-group biases. Furthermore,
Clément and Dukes discuss how one’s interest toward events in
the environment might be biased by their normative significance,
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i.e., by the degree to which these are relevant for social
norms and for the self-concept in the community. Additional
contributions suggest how people’s behavior during situations
involving division of goods can be understood prevalently in
terms of fairness norms or equality heuristics, according to
which people are eager to sanction unequal divisions even at
their own expenses (Civai). For instance, Shaw and Olson show
that children from 6 to 8 years of age will correct (or at least
attempt to minimize) unequal distributions of tokens between
two unknown kids. In adults, two articles suggest a major role
of fairness heuristics in the well-known Ultimatum Game task
(Civai; Guney and Newell): in both cases the authors argue that
individuals (responders) refuse money which is freely offered
to them when part of an unequal division, regardless of their
ongoing emotional response (Civai) or of the alleged intentions
of person (the proposer) who is making the offer (Guney and
Newell).
STABLE-TO-TRANSIENT DIMENSION
Most of the studies reviewed in the previous section describe
factors that, despite their difference, can be classified as stable,
i.e., they are held to exert a long-lasting effect on individual
social behavior. These can be understood as general behavioral
determinants, which transcend specific situations. Although
important, stable determinants have only an approximate
predictive power, as a large variability of individual social
behavior can be explained in terms of transient factors related
to the specificities of the interpersonal situation. For instance,
as individual social behavior can be partly explained by
idiosyncratic features of the individual, they can as well be
affected by factors that temporally alter the individual’s state and
how he/she interacts with the social environment.
Several studies document that people’s social behavior can be
affected by manipulating their preexisting emotional state, for
instance by showing them arousing stimuli, exposing them to
stressful vs. rewarding conditions, or engaging them in emotion
regulation strategies. As for the case of genetic polymorphisms,
these preexisting emotional states can alter the mental and brain
processes critical for individual social behavior, thus showing
how affective and social functioning might rely on partially
overlapping systems. For instance, Eskine presents compelling
evidence that people’s moral coding might be grounded in the
same processes underlying gustatory disgust (see also Eskine
et al., 2011, 2012). Likewise, in line with a rich body of literature
showing how empathetic reactions to others’ pain and disgust
recruit similar neural structures as those involved in first-hand
experiences of pain and disgust (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2011,
2016; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012, but see Krishnan et al., 2016),
Marsh argues that dysfunctions in fear experience might lead to
a reduced capacity to recognize fear in others (see also Adolphs
et al., 1994).
Several contributions examine the role of preexisting
emotional states in decision-making using behavioral economics
paradigms. The theoretical framework underlying most of
these studies posits that individual decisions result from the
interaction of at least two different brain systems (Dual-System
model—see Halali et al.): the cognitive/deliberate system (slow,
controlled, cognitively-demanding, and instantiated mainly
in prefrontal cortex) and the affective system (fast, automatic,
cognitively non-demanding, and instantiated predominantly in
limbic regions). As these two systems might promote conflicting
courses of actions, transient emotional induction can be used
as a mean to strengthen the affective contribution to a decision,
as shown by Eimontaite et al. who find that inducing anger in
people makes them less cooperative in social decision-making
tasks such the Trust Game and the Prisoner Dilemma. Using a
complementary approach, some studies engaged participants
in emotion regulations strategies, by asking them to up- or
down-regulate their emotional responses. Such regulation was
found to have a significant impact on subsequent behavior
(Grecucci et al.; van’t Wout et al.) and brain responses (Grecucci
et al.) in tasks such the Ultimatum and Dictator Game.
CONTEXTUAL AND SOCIAL APPRAISAL
Accounts such as the Dual-SystemModel have been criticized for
their dichotomous separation between cognition and emotion,
which appears oversimplistic and not supported by empirical
evidence (e.g., Moll et al., 2008; Shackman et al., 2011;
Koban and Pourtois, 2014; Phelps et al., 2014). Alternative
theoretical frameworks suggest instead that emotion is not
a unitary construct opposed to cognition, and that distinct
affective/motivational components may impact behavior in
different (and in some cases opposite) ways (Moll et al.,
2008; Phelps et al., 2014). In particular, appraisal theories of
emotions (e.g., the Component Process Model by Scherer, 1984,
2009) propose that affective experience is critically determined
by a series of cognitive evaluations (appraisal checks) of the
environment in terms of events’ novelty, valence, impact on one’s
goals, and how they can be dealt with. For instance, sadness
is based on the awareness of the presence of a salient negative
event (e.g., the occurrence of a terminal disease), undermining
personal goals (it will end one’s life), against which no course
of action seems effective. The same event can instead induce an
emotional response of higher arousal (such as anger or rage), if
associated with the belief that a solution (a treatment) is available.
In this perspective, the Component Process Model is not merely
a theory of emotions, but can be seen as a comprehensive
framework in which cognitive evaluation of the environment,
affective reactions, and preparation of a behavioral response are
integrated into a unique system.
For the purpose of this editorial, the appraisal checks proposed
by the Component Process Model (Scherer, 1984, 2009) are good
candidate processes for explaining how the social environment
should not be considered as a stable construct exerting long-
lasting effects on individual behavior, but also as the result of
multiple contextual or transitory factors that, when combined
together, make each inter-personal situation unique. In accord
with this view, several contributions to this Research Topic
suggest that individual affective and behavioral responses might
be determined by evaluations of the social context, some of
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which correspond to the same appraisal checks described in the
Component ProcessModel. For instance, Maresh et al. show that,
in anxious individuals, neural responses to threatening electrical
stimuli are modulated by whether participants are alone or close
to a person that could be a stranger or a friend. Furthermore,
Clark-Polner and Clark review how interpersonal behavior
(e.g., reaction to others’ emotions, providing and receiving
social support) are affected by the context of the relationship.
Similarly, Baez et al. suggest that the social proficiency of
individuals with Asperger Syndrome could improve when the
contextual information from social settings is made explicit.
Finally, Alexopoulos et al. had participants playing as responders
in a modified Ultimatum Game task, and find that the neural
activity inMPFC to unfair offers is affected by whether they could
retaliate against the proposer (which reflects a change in coping
potential).
Due to the dynamic properties of interpersonal relationships
and interactions, simple appraisal checks such the assessment of
novelty, valence, coping potential, etc. are often not sufficient
to tackle the complexities of social situations. Among the many
contextual/transitory properties of the environment that need to
be appraised, there is also the presence of other human beings,
each with their own mental states and cognitive appraisals.
Let’s imagine, for instance, the case in which an individual is
observing a friend, in the attempt to infer his/her emotional
states. It is reasonable that, to do so, the individual might
model the behavior of the observed friend in relation of the
most likely determinants, including his/her contextual appraisal.
In particular, the individual can assess if the friend is sad,
by checking whether he/she believes to be terminally ill and
that a treatment might not be available (see also Corradi-
Dell’Acqua et al., 2014). This is an example of social appraisal, in
which each individual represents contextual aspects of the social
environment also in terms of how other bystanders evaluate
the same environment from their point of view (see Manstead
and Fischer, 2001; Clément and Dukes). Social appraisal refers
to individuals’ metacognitive abilities, and has close ties with
concepts such as mentalizing, theory-of-mind, and perspective
taking. Importantly, the role played by social appraisal has
been highlighted in this Research Topic by articles focusing
on impression formation (Kuzmanovic et al.), interpersonal
relationships (Bombari et al.) and monetary transactions (Halali
et al.; Tomasino et al.). In particular, the behavioral and
neural responses of individuals (responders) to unfairness in
the Ultimatum Game can be affected by whether the monetary
transaction is framed by the proposer in terms of offer (“I give”)
or acquisition (“I take”; Sarlo et al., 2013; Tomasino et al..)
Furthermore, Halali et al. suggest that, when playing as proposers
in the Ultimatum and Dictator Game tasks, participants
most automatic choices are driven by considerations about
whether the responder can retaliate against a potential unfair
treatment.
Social appraisal can be differentiated from other kinds of
contextual evaluations at the neural level. In particular, in line
with existing models on the organization of MPFC (Lieberman,
2007; Forbes and Grafman, 2010; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al.,
2015), Bzdok et al. use meta-analytical evidence to propose
a segregation between a dorsal portion, involved in top-
down, controlled, metacognitive abilities, and a ventral portion
involved in bottom-up, automatic evaluative-related processes.
This segregation is also supported by Kang et al. who show
how the dorsal MPFC is implicated in accurately estimating
other people’s preferences, whereas the ventral MPFC is recruited
when using the Self as a proxy for the estimation. Furthermore,
Grossmann reports that, already at the age of 5 months, dorsal
MPFC might be implicated in triadic interactions, in which
infants establish eye contact with others, in order direct their
attention to specific objects/events in the external environment
(see also Grossmann and Johnson, 2010). It should be stressed,
however, that this segregation between dorsal and ventral regions
is at odds with other studies from our Research Topic: on the one
side, Farrow et al. implicate the dorsal (but not ventral) MPFC
in the processing and evaluation of threatening words, picture
and sounds; on the other hand, ventral (but not dorsal) MPFC
is associated with processes related to social appraisal, such as
the differential treatment of human and computer opponents
in monetary transactions (Moretto et al.), or the conformity to
the decision of in-group peers in a perceptual estimation task
(Stallen et al.).
CONCLUSIONS
In the last decades, psychologist and neuroscientists invested
a considerable amount of research to investigate the ability to
act “socially,” which is considered an evolutionary advantage
of many species (Matusall). The present Research Topic is
a collection of a large number (38) of original contributions
from an interdisciplinary community which together highlight
that determinants of individual social behavior should be best
understood along at least two different dimensions. This general
perspective represents the backbone for a comprehensive and
articulated model of how people and their brains interact with
each other in social contexts. However, despite its appeal, it
remains unclear how the model put forward in this editorial
relates to particular paradigms with high ecological value,
where it is more difficult to neatly disentangle the relative
contribution of personal/environmental or stable/transient
determinants. This is for instance the case of Preston et al.
who investigated hospitalized terminal patients, measuring the
emotional reactions elicited in observers and whether they
were related to the frequency with which aid was delivered. In
this perspective, a great challenge for future research in social
psychology and neuroscience will indeed be to develop more
accurate predictive models of social behavior and to make them
applicable to ecologically valid settings.
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